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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is before the Court on appeal from the district court's decision revoking 
Krystal Easley's probation and executing a reduced sentence. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In August 2005, Defendant Krystal Easley consented to a police search of her 
car and person that yielded two pipes and a container with methamphetamine residue. 
(11/22/2005 PSI, p. 2.) Easley later pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance. (R, pp. 59-60. 1) The district court sentenced Easley to a unified term of 
four years with two years fixed, but suspended sentence and ordered supervised 
probation subject to conditions. (R, pp. 82-86.) 
In September 2007, Easley admitted to probation violations, including 
absconding and not staying in touch with her probation officer. (R, p. 111.) At her 
disposition hearing the following month, the district court granted the state's motion to 
revoke Easley's probation, and re-imposed her original sentence; but the court again 
ordered probation subject to conditions. (R, p. 115.) 
1 Citations to the Court Record reference the electronic copy's pagination. 
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In July 2010, Easley admitted to further probation violations. (R., pp. 178-80.2) 
This time, her admissions included possessing and using methamphetamine and 
violating a no contact order. (R., p. 180.) At her disposition hearing in September 
2010, the district court granted the state's (second) motion to revoke probation, and 
again re-imposed her original sentence. (R., p. 197.) This time, the court retained 
jurisdiction for Easley to participate in a rider program. (R., pp. 197-98.) At the rider 
review hearing in February 2010, the district court suspended the sentence and once 
again ordered probation subject to conditions. (R., pp. 205-07.) 
In April 2011, the state filed a third motion to revoke probation. (R., pp. 214-16.) 
In November 2011, Easley admitted the violations (R., p. 233), which included failing to 
provide drug tests, actively avoiding supervision by her probation officer, and 
absconding. (R., pp. 215-16.) The district court reinstated probation and ordered her to 
undergo a substance abuse assessment and a mental health examination. (R., pp. 
234,236.) 
Sometime around October 2011, Easley again violated probation by providing 
false information to lawenforcement. (R., p. 242.) In December 2011, Easley admitted 
the violation. (R., p. 258.) At the disposition hearing in January 2012, the district court 
revoked probation for the fourth time, and executed the sentence. (R., pp. 268-69.) 
Easley timely appealed. (R., p. 462.3) 
2 Around this time, the district court began using a second case number (#10-7265) in 
addition to that for her original offense (#05-7711). (R., p. 183.) 
31n March 2012, Easley's appeals on the two state court cases were consolidated. (R., 
p.476.) 
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In April 2012, transcripts of the following hearings were lodged in the court 
record: 10/17/05 Entry of Guilty Plea Hearing, 11/28/05 Sentencing Hearing, and 
1/31/12 Disposition Hearing. (R., p. 478.) In July 2012, Easley's counsel filed a motion 
to augment the record to include transcripts from the following hearings: 9/17/07 
Admit/Deny Hearing, 10/29/07 Disposition Hearing, 2/22/11 Rider Review Hearing, 
11/15/11 Admit/Deny Hearing, and 12/5/11 Admit/Deny Hearing. (7/27/12 Appellant's 
Mot. to Augment.) This Court granted the motion in part and denied in part, adding to 
the record only transcripts of the 11/15/11 Admit/Deny Hearing, and the 12/5/11 
Admit/Deny Hearing. 4 (8/13/12 Order.) 
4 The State did not object to the admission of these transcripts, but objected to 
transcripts of the earlier probation violation hearings because Easley's notice of appeal 
as to those probation revocations was untimely. (See 7/31/12 Objection in Part.) 
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ISSUES 
Easley states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Easley due process and 
equal protection when it denied her Motion to Augment with the 
requested transcripts? 
2. Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the 
prosecutor to prevent a district court from considering the 
placement of a defendant into mental health court violate Idaho's 
separation of powers doctrine? 
3. Does the Fifth Judicial District's practice, which allows the 
prosecutor to prevent a district court from considering a defendant 
as a candidate for mental health court violate the constitutional 
requirement that all courts of the same class have uniform judicial 
powers, procedures, and practices? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. 
Easley's probation? 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further 
reduce Ms. Easley's sentences sua sponte upon revoking 
probation? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Easley failed to show that transcripts she sought to add to the appellate 
record were relevant or necessary for adequate, effective review, and thus failed 
to demonstrate a due process or equal protection violation by this Court in 
denying her request? 
2. Has Easley failed to establish that the Fifth Judicial District's practice of giving 
prosecutors veto power over participation in mental health court violates Idaho's 
Constitution? 
3. Has Easley failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking Easley's probation upon her admission to repeated probation violations, 
or by reducing Easley's sentence less than she wanted? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Easley Has Failed To Show That Transcripts She Sought To Add To The Appellate 
Record Were Relevant Or Necessary For Adequate, Effective Review, And Thus Fails 
To Demonstrate A Due Process Or Equal Protection Violation By This Court In Denying 
Her Request 
A. Introduction 
Easley requested and was provided transcripts from hearings pertaining to her 
underlying offense and conviction, as well as her most recent admissions to probation 
violations. (8/13/12 Order.) However, this Court denied her request for transcripts of a 
rider review hearing and an earlier probation violation hearing. (Id.) Easley argues that 
the Court's denial of these transcripts violates her right to due process and equal 
protection. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-20.) Because Easley misapplies the relevant law, 
her arguments fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where, as here, a defendant appeals the denial of a motion to augment the 
record, the Idaho Court of Appeals will evaluate and rule on it as a renewed motion. 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 837 (Ct. App. 2012). A motion to 
augment is appropriately renewed where new evidence or the parties' briefing has 
clarified or expanded the issues on appeal, thus supporting addition of the requested 
documents. lQ. Here, as in Morgan, there does not appear to be sufficient basis to 
warrant a renewed motion to augment. Id. But, assuming the motion was properly 
raised, see id., the state now responds on the merits of Easley's claim. 
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C. Denial Of The Motion to Augment Does Not Violate Easley's Due Process Right 
Because The Requested Documents Are Not Relevant To The Issues On 
Appeal 
Easley argues that denial of her motion to augment the record violates her right 
to due process. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-17.) In support, Easley offers a broad 
discussion of Idaho case law, but fails to clearly identify the applicable law. Under 
Idaho law, the appellate court must consider whether Easley has been denied "a record 
on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding 
the proceedings below." Morgan, 153 Idaho at _,288 P.3d at 838 (citations omitted). 
Although the record on appeal is not confined to those facts arising between sentencing 
and the probation revocation appealed, id. (citing State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 
218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009)), it need not include "all proceedings in the trial court up 
to and including sentencing." Id. (emphasis original). Rather, the appellate court will 
consider those elements of the trial court record relevant to the probation revocation 
issues and that are properly part of the appellate record. lsl 
In Morgan, similar to this case, the defendant had more than one probation 
violation admission hearing, and more than one disposition hearing. 19.. at 837. On 
appeal, Morgan moved to augment the record to include hearing transcripts regarding 
his initial probation violation, but was denied. lsl The Morgan court ultimately hung its 
hat on the defendant's untimely objection to the clerk's record under Idaho Appellate 
Rule 29(a). lsl However, the substantive rule articulated in Morgan still applies: that 
the appellate court need only consider those elements of the record below that were 
germane to the trial court's probation revocation decision. lsl To prevail on Easley's 
first issue, she must show that the transcripts from proceedings relating to her first 
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probation violation were germane to the trial court's revocation decision challenged in 
this appeal. 5 Easley fails to do so. 
Notably, the Morgan court said, "[t]his Court will not assume the omitted 
transcripts would support the district court's revocation order since they were not before 
the district court in the [final] probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave 
no indication that it based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during 
those prior hearings." Id. at 838. As in that case, the district court here gave no 
indication that its decision revoking Easley's probation and imposing sentence was 
based on information provided in prior hearings but not for her final disposition hearing. 
(1/31/12 Disposition Tr.) The transcript reflects instead that the court revoked Easley's 
probation based on information provided for the final hearing that meticulously 
chronicled Easley's history of probation violations and unresponsiveness to 
rehabilitative programming. (1/31/12 Disp. Tr., pp. 31-38.) 
Easley has failed to show that transcripts from her prior hearings would be at all 
relevant for review of the district court's decision revoking Easley's probation and 
imposing sentence. Absent any relevance, Easley has not shown that exclusion of the 
transcripts in the appellate record hinders her counsel's ability to provide effective 
assistance. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19.) Accordingly, Easley's due process 
arguments fail. 
5 As discussed in the State's objection to Easley's initial motion to augment, this Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear a challenge to the first probation violation. (See 7/31/12 
Objection in Part.) 
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D. Easley Has Failed To Show The Requested Transcripts Are Needed For 
Adequate And Effective Review, So As To Support An Equal Protection 
Challenge 
Easley also argues that the court's denial of her motion to augment the record 
violates her right to equal protection under the law. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-17.) 
Easley cites a number of Idaho statutes and rules that she argues require transcripts to 
be provided for indigent defendants at county expense. (See Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
According to Easley, the court's denial of her motion amounted to disparate treatment 
based on her indigence. (Id. at 8.) However, the statutes and cases cited by Easley do 
not support her argument. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has said that "[d]estitute defendants must be afforded 
as adequate appel/ate review as defendants who have money enough to buy 
transcripts." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591 (1956). The Griffin 
court specifically provided that its holding did not require a state to pay for transcripts 
whenever a defendant requests it; rather, "adequate and effective appellate review" 
may be provided to indigent defendants through other means. lsL at 20, 76 S.Ct. at 
591. 
In her initial motion to augment, Easley failed to demonstrate that transcripts of 
initial probation violation proceedings are needed to insure adequate and effective 
appellate review. (Appellant's Mot. to Augment.) Thus, this Court appropriately denied 
her motion. (8/14/12 Order.) On her renewed request, Easley again fails to 
demonstrate that the requested transcripts are necessary. Even if she did demonstrate 
that those records were in some way relevant to her appeal, Easley has not established 
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that a transcription of proceedings at county expense is the only way to satisfy her right 
to equal protection. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20, 76 S.Ct. at 591. 
Easley contends that, "if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, the 
transcript must be created at county expense." (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) One statutory 
provision cited by Easley provides that the court reporter shall be paid at county 
expense where the accused lacks financial means to pay. I.C. § 1-1105(2). However, 
that provision applies to transcripts of proceedings ordered by the court following a 
party's written request. I.C. § 1-1105(1). This does not apply because this Court did 
not order but instead denied the transcripts requested. The second provision cited by 
Easley requires county reimbursement for the cost of transcription "necessarily 
incurred" in representing an indigent defendant. I.C. § 19-863(a). As already 
discussed, Easley has made no showing whatsoever that the requested transcripts are 
necessary. 
Easley also argues that production of transcripts by an indigent defendant is 
required by Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2. But this rule concerns requests made to the 
district court for purposes of a criminal trial. The Idaho Appellate Rules, not the 
Criminal Rules, apply to Easley's appeal. No Idaho Appellate Rule requires the 
appellate court to provide a county-paid transcript upon request by an indigent 
defendant. 
For these reasons, the court should deny Easley's first argument renewing her 
Motion to Augment. 
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II. 
Easley Has Failed To Show That The Fifth judicial District's Practice Of Giving 
Prosecutors Veto Power Over Participation In Mental Health Court Violated Idaho's 
Constitution 
A. Introduction 
Easley raises two constitutional challenges to the prosecutor's veto of her 
placement in mental health court. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-37.) According to Easley, 
this veto power, held by the prosecutor in Idaho's Fifth Judicial District, violates both the 
separation of powers doctrine, and the requirement of uniformity in judicial powers and 
practices. (ld.) Because she cannot establish a constitutional violation, Easley's 
arguments fail. 
B. Legal Standard 
Easley's constitutional challenges are legal issues that the appellate court 
reviews de novo. State v. Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 440,64 P.3d 967, 969 (2003). Easley 
acknowledges she did not object to the prosecutor's veto power. (Appellant's brief, p. 
22.) Where a party asserts an unobjected-to fundamental error, she must show that 
the error (1) violates an unwaived constitutional right, (2) that it plainly exists, (3) and 
that it was not harmless. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). 
As to the second prong, an error is plain where "existing authorities have 
unequivocally resolved the issue in the appellant's favor." State v. Hadden, 152 Idaho 
371, 375,271 P.3d 1227, 1231 (Ct. App. 2012). As demonstrated below, Idaho law 
does not support that there was a constitutional violation. Accordingly, she does not 
satisfy any of the required elements for fundamental error. 
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C. Easley Has Failed To Show That The Prosecutorial Veto Power Permitted Under 
The Idaho Drug Court and Mental Health Court Act Violates The Separation Of 
Powers Doctrine 
In challenging the prosecutor's veto power, Easley does not address the 
enabling statute, the Idaho Drug Court and Mental Health Court Act. 6 I.C. §§ 19-5601, 
et seq. Importantly, the Fifth Judicial District's practice of requiring prosecutorial 
approval for a defendant to participate in drug or mental health court, is expressly 
permitted by the Act. See I.C. § 19-5606. To understand this and the Act's impact 
here, some background is warranted. 
The Act established Idaho's drug and mental health courts as "innovative 
diversion efforts," State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 739 n.1, 170 P.3d 881, 882 (2007), 
to alleviate jail and prison overcrowding, and address mental health and substance-
abuse needs of offenders, among other goals. I.C. § 19-5602. The Act requires 
creation of a "coordinating committee" involving judges and court administrators, 
prosecutors and public defenders, treatment providers, law enforcement, legislators, 
mental health professionals, and a representative of the governor's office, among 
others. I.C. § 19-5606. This collaborative committee is responsible for developing 
guidelines regarding issues including eligibility, treatment, and evaluation. 1.9..: Under 
the Act, "[n]o person has a right to be admitted into a mental health court" or drug court. 
I.C. §§ 19-5609(1), 5604(1). 
Where a statute's language is unambiguous, the legislature's clearly expressed 
intent is given effect. State v. Dickerson, 142 Idaho 514, 517,129 P.3d 1263,1266 (Ct. 
6The law was first enacted by the Idaho legislature in 2001 as the Idaho Drug Court Act, 
and amended in 2005 as the Idaho Drug Court and Mental Health Court Act. I.C. §§ 
19-5601, et seq. 
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App. 2006) (citations omitted). If ambiguous, the court will try to determine the 
legislative intent, and will construe the statute given its language, the reasonableness of 
proposed interpretations, and policy considerations. .lit By its language, the Act here 
provides for development of eligibility guidelines by a committee including members of 
all branches of government. I.C. § 19-5606. Nothing in the Act's language precludes a 
guideline wherein participation is determined by the county prosecutor. The question is 
whether the prosecutorial veto power, as permitted by the Act, violates the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
Article V, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution provides that "[t]he legislature shall 
have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which 
rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government .... J! Idaho Const. 
art. v, sect. 13. Whether the Act violates this separation of powers provision is one of 
first impression in Idaho. However, other jurisdictions' treatments of similar statutes 
offer guidance. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals addressed the issue with respect to drug court in 
State v. Graves, 58 Or.App. 286, 648 P.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1982). There, the court noted 
that the decision to prosecute a defendant is well-established . .lit at 290, 648 P.2d at 
868. Reasoning that "the power to decide whether to divert a defendant for drug 
treatment is no more intrusive on the judicial branch than the power to decide whether 
to take any action against a defendant at all," the Graves court found no separation of 
powers violation . .lit at 290-91, 648 P.2d at 868-69. 
The Washington Court of Appeals also addressed the issue as to drug court in 
State v. Diluzio, 121 Wash.App. 822, 90 P.3d 1141 (Ct. App. 2004). In that case, the 
12 
court noted that the purpose of drug court - to reduce recidivism and substance abuse 
among nonviolent abusing offenders7 - "is best met when the prosecutor makes the 
initial eligibility determination." ~ at 828, 90 P.3d at 1144. This is true, the court 
found, because "the prosecutor is more involved with the defendant to best assess his 
or her eligibility." ~ The "practice of allowing the prosecutor to make the initial 
determinations of drug court eligibility [is not] an unconstitutional delegation of judicial 
power to the prosecutor." ~ at 828, 90 P.3 at 1144. Thus, the Diluzio court held that 
statute did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. ~ 
The court in Diluzio cited similar holdings by the louisiana Supreme Court, 
State v. Taylor, 769 SO.2d 535, 537 (la. 2000), and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals, Woodward v. Morrissey, 991 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Ok.App. 1999). ~ at 828-29, 
90 P.3d at 1144-45. 
The courts' analyses in Graves and Diluzio apply here. Mental health court, like 
drug court, involves the collaborative efforts of all branches of state government, as well 
as community organizations and professional providers. See I.C. §§ 19-5602, et seq. 
As recognized by the court in Diluzio, the prosecutor is in the best position to assess a 
defendant's eligibility. Diluzio, at 828, 90 P.3d at 1144. 
At Easley's disposition hearing, her counsel expressed that mental health 
evaluators recommended Easley's participation in mental health court (1/31/12 Tr., p. 
38, ls. 18-23). Although a mental health evaluator can certainly identify if someone 
has a mental health need, this is only one consideration in the eligibility calculus. Other 
factors include the defendant's likely success in mental health court, and optimal use of 
7 Diluzio, 121 Wash.App. at 825,90 P.3d at 1143. 
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the state's limited resources. See I.C. § 19-5606 (coordinating committee shall 
"recommend funding priorities and decisions per judicial district"). 
The prosecutor acknowledged that Easley "may have or does have some mental 
health issues," but recommended that the issues could be addressed outside of mental 
health court. (1/31/12 Tr., p. 37, L. 23 - p. 38, L. 1. Also, the prosecutor noted that 
Easley had "been less than up front with law enforcement," and had "absconded 
probation." (1/31/12 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 2-4.) These observations addressed other relevant 
aspects of the decision to pursue mental health court. 
The discretion afforded the prosecutor in determining Easley's mental health 
court eligibility parallels the wide discretion given prosecutors in deciding what charge(s) 
to file. See State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 12, 27 P.3d 417, 421 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(citation omitted). Just as the facts in a case may legitimately invoke more than one 
criminal statute, id., the facts may also support multiple options for addressing the 
mental health issues of a defendant. The legislature acknowledged the variability of 
these facts in mandating the formation of a mental health coordinating committee to 
decide eligibility, among other decisions. I.C. § 19-5606. 
Other than the veto of Easley's participation in mental health court, the 
prosecutor did not hinder the district court's ability to sentence Easley. Indeed, the 
district court reduced Easley's sentence to two and a half years fixed, four and a half 
indeterminate (1/31/12 Tr., p. 50, Ls. 5-8), from the prosecution's recommendation of 
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three years fixed with four years indeterminate8 (1/31/12 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 7-9). Also, the 
court recommended a therapeutic community placement or other "mental health 
modalities that may be available" in the penitentiary. (1/31/12 Tr., p. 49, L. 25 - p. 50, 
L. 3.) These options suggest that mental health court is not the sole means of 
addressing defendants' mental health concerns; the availability of alternatives is yet 
another consideration for a defendant's candidacy into mental health court. 
Ultimately, Easley has failed to show that the requirement of prosecutorial 
approval for her participation in mental health court is an impermissible encroachment 
on judicial power. Rather, the record demonstrates that the prosecutor's exercise of 
veto power was squarely within its valid legislatively delegated authority. Given the 
Act's objectives, the multiple considerations for participation in mental health court, and 
the district court's otherwise unencumbered sentencing power, there was no separation 
of powers violation here. 
D. Easley Has Failed To Demonstrate A Violation Of Uniform Judicial Powers, 
Procedures, And Practices 
Easley also argues that the prosecutor's veto power violates the constitutional 
requirement that all courts of the same class have uniform powers, procedures, and 
practices under Article V, Section 26 of the Idaho Constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
35-37.) That section provides that: 
All laws relating to court shall be general and of uniform operation 
throughout the state, and the organized judicial powers, proceedings, and 
practices of all the courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated 
8 This was the prosecutor's recommendation for the 2010 case, to run concurrently with 
a two year fixed, two year indeterminate sentence for Easley's 2005 case. (1/31/12 Tr., 
p. 38, Ls. 7-8.) 
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by law, and the force and effect of the proceedings, judgments, and 
decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform. 
Idaho Const., art. V, § 26. According to Easley, this provision was violated because the 
veto power afforded prosecutors in the Fifth Judicial District, over eligibility into mental 
health court, is inconsistent with mental health court practices in other districts. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 35-36 (citing 1/31/12 Tr., p. 40, Ls. 17-22).) 
This argument relies on the premise that the prosecutor's veto power is a court 
procedure or practice. As argued in the preceding section, the requirement of 
prosecutorial approval for participation in mental health court is not a judicial function. 
Instead, it is a function validly conferred to the prosecutor under the language of the 
Act. See I.C. 19-5606. Because Easley cannot show that the prosecutorial veto power 
is a judicial function, she also fails to show lack of uniformity in judicial powers, 
procedures, or practices. 
I" . 
Easley Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Revoking Easley's Probation Upon Her Admission To Repeated Probation Violations, 
Or By Reducing Easley's Sentence Less Than She Wanted 
A. Introduction And Legal Standard 
Easley's remaining arguments assert that the district court abused its discretion 
in revoking her probation and imposing sentence. On review of a district court's 
decision revoking probation, the appellate court considers (1) whether the defendant 
violated probation, and (2) whether probation should be revoked or continued. State v. 
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009). The appellate court will defer to 
the district court's credibility determinations, and will not disrupt the district court's 
decision revoking probation absent showing that it abused its discretion. Id. Easley 
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concedes that she violated probation. (Appellant's brief, p. 38.) Thus the question is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation. 
As to sentencing, a trial court's sentence that is within statutory limits must also 
be undisturbed absent showing that it clearly abused its discretion. State v. Windom, 
150 Idaho 873, 875, 253 P.3d 310, 312 (2011) (citation omitted). To carry her burden, 
an appellant must show that her sentence is excessive "under any reasonable view of 
the facts," considering the objectives of criminal punishment: protection of society, 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution or punishment. Windom, 150 Idaho at 876, 
253 P.3d at 313. In reviewing an excessive sentence claim, the appellate court 
independently reviews the record, examining the nature of the offense, and the 
offender's character. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132,267 P.3d 709, 719 (2011) 
(citation omitted). Where reasonable minds could differ as to whether a sentence is 
excessive, the appellate court will not disturb it. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 
P.3d 935,941 (2011) (citation omitted). 
In determining whether the district court abused its discretion - as to a probation 
revocation or in sentencing - the appellate court considers (1) whether the trial court 
understood that the issue was discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within its 
discretionary scope and under applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court 
exercised reason. Miller, 151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (citation omitted). Here, 
Easley challenges only the final consideration, whether the district court exercised 
reason. 
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B. Easley Has Not Met Her Burden Of Showing That Her Probation Revocation 
Was An Abuse Of Discretion, Or That Her Sentence Was Excessive Under Any 
Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Given the facts, Easley does not come close to showing that the district court 
abused its discretion. As to her probation revocation, Easley's history of repeated 
probation violations more than supports revocation. (R., pp. 111, 178-80, 233, 242.) 
After no fewer than four motions to revoke probation, to which Easley admitted 
violations, it is plain that the goal of rehabilitation was not being satisfied. See State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525,529,20 P.3d 709,713 (Ct. App. 2001). There is simply no basis 
to disturb the district court's decision revoking probation. 
As to sentencing, the district court reduced Easley's sentence to two and a half 
years fixed from the prosecutor's recommendation of three years fixed (to run 
concurrent with term of two years fixed in other case). (1/31/12 Tr., p. 38, Ls. 4-9; p. 
50, Ls. 5-8.) This reduced sentence, in light of Easley's repeated probation violations 
was certainly reasonable - even generous. In arguing her sentence is excessive, 
Easley notes only that she suffers from mental health problems, and that she has family 
support. As discussed above, there may be therapeutic programs available in the 
penitentiary system to address her mental health concerns. (See 1/31/12 Tr., pp. 59-
50.) In light of the record, Easley has not satisfied her burden of showing the district 
court's order should be disturbed under any reasonable view of the facts. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the state respectfully requests that this court deny 
Easley's appeal. 
DATED this 31st day of January 2013. 
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